Liberalization of Taiwan’s Securities Markets: The Case of Cross-Taiwan-Strait Listings by Wang, Wen-yeu & CHEN, Christopher Chao-hung
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Law School of Law
2-2011
Liberalization of Taiwan’s Securities Markets: The
Case of Cross-Taiwan-Strait Listings
Wen-yeu Wang
National Taiwan Univ.
Christopher Chao-hung CHEN
SMU, chchen@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research
Part of the Asian Studies Commons, and the Securities Law Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Law by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
Wang, Wen-yeu and CHEN, Christopher Chao-hung. Liberalization of Taiwan’s Securities Markets: The Case of Cross-Taiwan-Strait
Listings. (2011). Banking and Financial Law Review. 26, (2), 259-282. Research Collection School Of Law.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/979
1 
 
 
Liberalization of Taiwan’s Securities Markets –  
The Case of Cross-Taiwan-Strait Listings 
 
Wallace Wen-yeu Wang*  
Christopher Chen Chao-hung**  
 
* Published in Banking & Financial Law Review, 2011, Volume 26, Issue 2, pp 259-282. 
 
Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the liberalization of Taiwan’s capital market 
regarding cross-Taiwan-Strait listing of securities. Taiwan is in an advantageous 
position to compete with other Asian rivals to attract issuers and capital from China. 
However, the long political hostility ensures that there is little regulatory cooperation 
on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Assuming that the creation of a cross-strait capital 
market is an unstoppable trend, this paper examines from the perspective of 
regulatory competition several regimes that may facilitate Taiwan to overcome 
regulatory obstacles arising from the special Sino-Taiwan relationship. This paper 
argues that regulatory cooperation or even harmonization of Sino-Taiwan laws will be 
very difficult. However, the cooperation of stock exchanges in China and Taiwan may 
be a first step toward further official collaboration. Another approach is to strengthen 
domestic supervision in Taiwan with a sponsorship program. Nevertheless, such a 
program may be very expensive to maintain. Given the regulatory obstacles between 
Taiwan and China, a better approach seems to open an alternative trading market with 
more flexible rules designed for Chinese securities in Taiwan. Such a market-oriented 
approach may liberalise Taiwan’s capital market to Chinese and foreigners, while still 
maintain the level of domestic investor protection without raising much regulatory 
and compliance costs.  
 
I. Introduction 
This article will explore how the Taiwanese government could best supervise the 
public listing and trading of overseas companies within Taiwan.  It will particularly 
focus on the listing of firms operating in China which are controlled by Taiwanese or 
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Chinese owners. In light of Taiwan’s growing economic ties with China, development 
of a cross-strait capital market presents a number of advantages and challenges for 
both sides.  
To begin with, economic ties between Taiwan and China are substantial and 
significant. The Taiwan Investment Commission of the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
(“MoEAIC”) reports that total approved investment in China by Taiwanese firms 
reached over US$9 billion annually in both 2007 and 2008.1 This fell to around US$6 
billion in 2009 following the global economic slowdown but rebounded in the first 
four months of 2010 with total indirect investment reaching over US$3.5 billion; a 
90% jump compared to the same period in 2009.2  According to the Financial 
Supervisory Commission (“FSC”), 910 listed companies in Taiwan had collectively 
invested more than US$20.7 billion3 in China in the third quarter of 2008 alone. 
Cross-straits trade was in excess of US$77 billion annually in both 2007 and 2008.4 
Taiwan’s trade surplus with Mainland China was over US$4.7 billion in the first 
quarter of 2010.5 As of 2009, China accounted for over 40% of Taiwan’s export 
market, making China Taiwan’s biggest trade partner.6 Besides these economic 
numbers a considerable number of Taiwanese nationals work in China.  
Notably these economic achievements have come about under restrictive laws enacted 
by Taiwan preventing capital flows between China and Taiwan. Direct exchange of 
New Taiwan Dollars and Chinese Renminbi was prohibited until June 2008 while 
                                                
* Professor of Law, National Taiwan University 
** Assistant Professor of Law, Singapore Management University 
1 Investment Commission statistics online: <http://www.moeaic.gov.tw/>. According to the same 
statistics, between 1991 and the end of 2009, there were a total number of 37,771 applications made by 
Taiwanese firms and approved by the Investment Commission to invest in Mainland China and the 
total amount of investment reached over 64 billion US dollars. Id. See also Chien-min Chao, Will 
Economic Integration between Mainland China and Taiwan Lead to a Congenial Political Culture?, 
(2003) 43 Asian Surv. 280, 280 . 
2 Investment Commission, ibid. 
3 See FSC press release on Nov. 18, 2008, online: 
<http://www.fscey.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=5086937&ctNode=17&mp=2.>. 
4 Statistics provided in the monthly report (for the month of April 2010) of the Bureau of Foreign Trade, 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, published on Jun. 3, 2010, online: 
<http://cweb.trade.gov.tw/kmi.asp?xdurl=kmif.asp&cat=CAT322>. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Statistics provided in the annual report of the Bureau of Foreign Trade for the year of 2009, online: 
<http://cweb.trade.gov.tw/kmi.asp?xdurl=kmif.asp&cat=CAT322>. 
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direct cross-strait financial services are still illegal. 7 Nevertheless, Taiwanese 
merchants have been resourceful in circumventing these restrictions by establishing 
offshore holding companies to conduct business in China.8 
While closer economic ties and the establishment of a cross-strait capital market 
appears to be an unstoppable trend, the Sino-Taiwan relationship involves 
complexities seldom seen in other contexts. The political impasse and concerns about 
sovereignty impair cross-strait diplomacy and prevent communication and functional 
regulatory cooperation between the two governments. This occurs despite Taiwan’s 
seemingly ironic need to embrace the Chinese market. Taiwan also faces the 
significant task of establishing itself as a player in the global capital markets to ensure 
their continued economic progress. Under the current administration’s peaceful 
development of economic and political ties, it now appears possible to form a 
previously unimaginable cross-strait capital market. But such a market raises concerns 
over how the Taiwanese government can best regulate securities issuers whose main 
business operations are in China. A friendlier economic environment does not 
necessarily mitigate difficulties in market supervision and investor protection across 
the strait. 
As will be argued below, the Sino-Taiwan relationship offers a tremendous 
opportunity to design and create a new cross-strait capital market. This article will not 
enter into the fray of examining the structure and composition of international 
securities regulations. Instead, our focus will be on the issues surrounding the 
establishment of cross-strait listing from the Taiwanese perspective.  In particular we 
will address how Taiwan can maximize its comparative advantage via a regulatory 
design that attracts foreign capital while at the same time effectively supervising the 
listing and trading of Chinese securities and ultimately improving Taiwan’s 
competitiveness in the global capital market.  
                                                
7 See Taiwan Central Bank press release on Jun. 26, 2008, online: 
<http://www.cbc.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=31807&ctNode=302&mp=1.>. 
8 E.g., Honghai, one of the most well-known high-tech companies in Taiwan, shifted its mobile phone 
manufacturing operations in China to Foxconn International Holding Ltd, a subsidiary incorporated in 
Cayman Islands and listed in Hong Kong, so that Honghai might have more liberty to conduct business 
in China without the wrath of Taiwan government. 
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Thus, the purpose of this article is to identify key policy concerns of the Taiwanese 
government and to discuss possible regulatory mechanisms for the offering and listing 
of Chinese securities in Taiwan. Part II will introduce the Sino-Taiwan relationship,  
the legal restraints preventing a cross-strait capital market, and the current state of the  
cross-strait securities market. Part III will examine the theoretical underpinning 
behind cross-border listings and regulatory competition. From this perspective, we 
will also discuss the strategic position of Taiwan in competing for cross-border 
listings and Chinese capital.  Part IV will offer some perspectives for the design of 
Taiwanese law to maximize Taiwan’s advantages and successfully supervise cross-
strait listings. We will contemplate an array of policies, including harmonization and 
mutual recognition between Taiwan and China, stock exchange cooperation, third 
party oversight, and creation of a separate trading platform for Chinese shares. In part 
V we conclude. 
II. The Backdrop: The Sino-Taiwan 
Relationship and Current State of 
Cross-Strait Listings 
A. A Brief History: 1945 - 2010 
The modern division of Taiwan and Mainland China occurred in 1949, when the 
People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.), led by Mao Zedong, was officially established 
in Beijing and the Republic of China (R.O.C.), led by Chiang Kai-shek, retreated to 
Taiwan. Since then, Taiwan and China have had a hostile relationship with occasional 
escalations to military conflict. Both governments claim that they are the sole 
legitimate “China” with authority to rule both Taiwan and the Chinese Mainland. 
The death of Taiwan President Chiang Ching-kuo, (son of Chiang Kai-shek) in 1987 
marked a turning point in Taiwan’s relationship with China. The island embraced 
democratic practices, and its people increasingly identified themselves as being 
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“Taiwanese”, rather than “Chinese”. This gradual change of attitude challenged the 
long-standing “one China” ideology on both sides of the Strait.  
With the ease in hostilities, each government established private entities to facilitate 
cross-strait dialogue: the “Strait Exchange Foundation” (“SEF”) in Taiwan, and the 
“Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits” (“ARATS”) in China.9 Both 
are government-funded quasi-official entities, aiding in the communication and 
negotiation of administrative matters. However, interactions between the two were 
halted in 1999 when then-President Lee Teng Hui  of Taiwan announced his “special 
state to state theory,” a policy whose implied thrust at sovereignty rankled Chinese 
officials. 
The surprise election of President Chen Shui-bian to two successive terms from 2000 
to 2008 was a critical period in cross-strait relations. During this time, Mainland 
China made huge economic strides while Taiwan became increasingly marginalized. 
As a longtime supporter of Taiwan independence, President Chen easily drew enmity 
from the Beijing government.10 Yet even while President Chen was anti-China in the 
political sense, from an economic perspective he was fairly progressive.  As the 
demands of globalization required businesses to become more flexible 
internationally11 he abandoned President Lee’s “practice patience and make no haste” 
policy (a policy designed to limit the amount of investment in China12) in favor of the 
less restrictive “proactive opening with effective management” approach.13 This move 
reflected the shifting of Taiwan’s commerce from traditional manufacturing sectors to 
hi-tech industry and the concomitant need for outward investment.  
Taiwan’s China policy was again altered by the presidential election in 2008 which 
saw a return to power for Ma-Ying Jeou’s victorious KMT party.  Ma’s government 
has adopted a much friendlier attitude toward China which has led to increased cross-
                                                
9 Both were established in 1991. See <http://www.sef.org.tw/english/index.html >. 
10 See online: < http://www.sef.org.tw/english/index.html>. 
11 Lee, supra note 12, at 282-287. 
12 Fu-lung Lee, On Policy, Law and Suggestion of Taiwanese Enterprise to Go Public in the Mainland 
Area (2005) 34(3) N.T.U. L.J. 277, 279. 
13 See policy description of the Mainland Affairs Council, online: 
<http://www.mac.gov.tw/big5/cnews/empl01.htm>. 
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straits exchange and the resumption of talks between SEF and ARATS.14 In addition 
to allowing direct currency exchange,15 raising the maximum investment in China to 
60% of a company’s capital,16 and establishing direct air and sea travel between 
Taiwan and China, the FSC is now proposing to ease restrictions on foreign firms 
seeking to list securities and raise capital in Taiwan.17 The Taiwan government will 
also allow Chinese funds to be invested in certain public construction projects and the 
Taiwan stock market.18  
At the top of the political agenda in 2010 is the negotiation of an Economic 
Cooperation and Framework Agreement (ECFA), which many see as a prelude to the 
creation of a free trade zone between China and Taiwan. ECFA’s driving motive is to 
avoid Taiwan’s marginalization in the aftermath of the free trade agreement between 
China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).19 While ECFA was 
signed between the two parties in Chongqing, China on June 20th, 2010, and it was 
ratified by the Taiwanese legislature on August 17th, 2010. However, to what extent 
the financial industry will be covered is yet to be revealed.  
How the story between Taiwan and China will unfold remains to be seen. Although 
President Ma faces criticism for appearing to concede sovereignty to Beijing and for 
Taiwan’s presumed over reliance on China’s economy, it is clear that the current 
administration’s policies have made it possible to further integrate Taiwan and 
China’s capital markets.20 Under the current framework, direct cross-strait capital and 
monetary flows is an unstoppable and rising trend.  
                                                
14 The first meeting took place in China in June, 2008. The second meeting took place on Nov. 3, 2008, 
which marked for the first time that a highly ranked Chinese official (who was also the chairman of the 
ARATS) was allowed to visit Taiwan. The third meeting was held on April, 2009 in Nanking, China. 
15 Financial Supervision Commission (FSC) press release on Jun. 27, 2008, online: 
<http://www.fscey.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=4448781&ctNode=2660&mp=2>. 
16 See MoEAIC press release on Aug. 26, 2008, online: 
<http://www.moeaic.gov.tw/system_external/ctlr?PRO=NewsLoad&id=608.>. 
17 See infra II.B. 
18 However, how far Taiwan is willing to allow Chinese funds to invest in public construction projects 
remain to be decided. See online: <http://udn.com/NEWS/FINANCE/FIN2/4884166.shtml>. 
19 The ASEAN had an Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation on Nov. 5, 
2002. See online: < http://www.aseansec.org/13196.htm>. It has been argued that a free-trade zone 
between China and the ASEAN might have huge impact to Taiwan’s economy. 
20 The criticism is best summarized by the Minister of Mainland Affairs defending publicly the 
government’s policy on Feb. 19, 2009. See online: <http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/index1-e.htm.>. 
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B. Legal Restraints on Cross-strait Capital 
Flows 
From a historical perspective, there are considerable legal restraints to the 
establishment of a functional cross-strait capital market. In Taiwan, special laws were 
first enacted in 1992 to regulate cross-strait communication and business activity.21 
The key concepts of these special laws were two-fold: to prevent China from exerting 
influence on Taiwan through economic means, and to limit Taiwanese investment and 
business operations in China.22 They also prohibit Mainland citizens from becoming 
directors in Taiwanese companies.23 Even travel into Taiwan and its territories by 
mainlanders is restricted. 24 At the same time, the laws place heavy restraints on 
Taiwanese investment in China.   A firm is not qualified to list in Taiwan if it was 
funded by a certain amount of Chinese capital, if a Chinese entity held more than a 
20% equity stake, or if the entity was a controlling shareholder.  The transfer of key 
technology to Chinese parties25 is also tightly controlled – complicated review 
procedures are applied to each potential transaction, and the subject matters are 
checked against a list of prohibited or restricted items based on “national security and 
industry development” concerns. Most importantly, neither local or foreign firms can 
use funds raised in Taiwan to invest either directly or indirectly in China.26  
This last measure in particular has stemmed all possibility of cross-strait capital flows. 
There is little doubt that these regulations have effectively forced Taiwan businesses 
and capital abroad; indeed, many businesses have already moved their assets to 
                                                
21 The Act Governing Relationships between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland 
(“AGRPTAM”)(last revised in 2008). Full English texts of the AGRPTAM could be found online: 
<http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/Fnews/FnewsContent.asp?msgid=2662&msgType=en&keyword=undefine
d.> 
22 AGRPTAM, article 40-1. A similar requirement is also placed for non-business entities. See 
AGRPTAM, article 40-2. 
23 AGRPTAM, article 72. 
24 AGRPTAM, articles 10, 11, 16, and 17. 
25 AGRPTAM, article 35. 
26 The listing rules of Taiwan Stock Exchange requires that a foreign firm meet requirements specified 
in the AGRPTAM and relevant regulations, which effectively subject foreign listed firms to the same 
restrictions as domestic firms. See Article 28-1 of the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation Rules 
Governing Review of Securities Listing (2008), online: 
<http://eng.selaw.com.tw/FLAWDAT01.asp?LSID=FL007326>.  
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offshore subsidiaries or holding companies (incorporated in Hong Kong, the British 
Virgin Islands, etc.) in order to enter the China market.27  
Heavy regulation has also had an impact on Taiwan’s domestic financial industry.  
With entry into China similarly restricted, Taiwan’s finance companies have lagged 
behind other foreign firms in penetrating the mainland. This late start would influence 
the competitive position of Taiwan’s financial services firms in the service of cross-
strait listing were it to occur.  The offshore movement of Taiwan’s businesses and 
listings abroad has also lessened the demand for financial services within Taiwan. 
This exodus of capital, coupled with a decline in Taiwan’s domestic stock market28 
has given rise to arguments for relaxing restrictions on China investment as a means 
to lure overseas funds to return home.   
For these reasons it is widely acknowledged in Taiwan that the foregoing laws create 
an undesirable state in which Taiwan is restricted from using its competitive 
advantages to attract money earned by overseas Taiwanese from their operations in 
China. In response to the foregoing, Taiwan has adopted two measures.  First, the 
Taiwanese government announced its “1-2-3 program” in early 2008 which sought to 
increase “first-time listings” by foreign companies (though specifically geared 
towards overseas companies controlled by Taiwanese) in the “two stock markets” 
(Taiwan Stock Exchange and the over-the-counter market) to realize “three benefits”: 
a closer connection between foreign enterprises and the Taiwan market; increased 
market diversification; and improved competitiveness and globalization of Taiwan’s 
capital market.29   
Second, on July 31, 2008, Taiwan announced an ambitious plan to relax restrictions 
on foreign stock listings and Chinese investment in its domestic stock market.30 This 
new policy aims to allow overseas firms controlled by Taiwanese to seek a primary or 
                                                
27 See Chyan Yang and Shiu-Wan Hung, Taiwan’s Dilemma across the Strait: Lifting the Ban on 
Semiconductor Investment in China (2003) 43 Asian Surv. 681, 681-682.  See also supra note 8. 
28 See Chia-chen Lee, A Study on the Issue of Taiwanese Enterprises Listing in Hong Kong (2008) 8 
Economic Research 357, 371. 
29 See Taiwan Stock Exchange presentation on Program to promote listing of foreign companies in 
Taiwan, online: < http://www.twse.com.tw/ch/listed/alien_business/download/plan.pdf>. 
30 Financial Supervisory Commission press release on Jul. 31, 2008, online: 
<http://www.fsc.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=4611074&ctNode=17&mp=2>. See also Taiwan Stock 
Exchange presentation on Program to promote listing of foreign companies in Taiwan, id. 
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secondary listing or to issue Taiwan depositary receipts (“TDR”) within Taiwan.31 
However, this plan still has certain imperfections in practice. For instance, while firms 
incorporated in China are still prohibited from having primary or secondary listings in 
Taiwan,32 the FSC now allows foreign firms in which a Chinese entity owns more 
than a 20% equity stake to make a primary or secondary listing.33 Moreover, foreign 
firms with investments in China can now be listed.34 The new rules even allow certain 
Chinese entities, including qualified domestic institutional investors, to invest in the 
equity and futures market.35  While direct listing of Chinese companies is still 
restricted, the above measures open up the possibility of Chinese firms’ creating a 
shareholding structure (such as establishing a third-country operation as the listing 
entity) to bypass restrictions. This creates a difficult task for regulators, who would 
have to penetrate a complex web of shareholding structure to discover the Chinese 
issuer. 
Of course, we should be aware that a complete opening of capital markets will not 
take place in a single day, particularly given all the policy concerns still in existence 
between China and Taiwan.36 While certain physical restraints may have been relaxed 
for the exchange of goods, a large part of the above restraints still exist to limit the 
inflow and outflow of capital across the Taiwan Strait.  
C. Current State of Cross-Strait Listing of 
Taiwanese Enterprises 
Over the past two decades, only a few enterprises have attempted to have securities 
traded on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.  This was due to several factors. First, as we 
have seen, Taiwan prevented the primary listing of a company incorporated in China 
due to the restrictions mentioned above.37 Similarly, a primary listing in China by a 
                                                
31 See supra note 29. 
32 FSC press release, supra note 30. 
33 Ibid.  
34 Ibid.  
35 See Financial Supervisory Commission press release on Apr. 29, 2009, online: 
<http://www.fsc.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=5793655&ctNode=17&mp=2>. 
36 See infra IV.A. 
37 See supra note 26 and 30. 
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company incorporated in Taiwan was also not possible due to the Chinese 
government’s own requirements on corporate structure.38 For example, PRC rules 
require a foreign firm to ensure that foreign capital will not represent more than 10% 
of outstanding shares after listing.39 Thus, even absent Taiwan’s already stringent 
regulations, any Taiwanese firms wishing to have securities listed in China must first 
establish a Chinese subsidiary. For the same reasons, secondary listings have not been 
possible for Chinese firms within Taiwan.  
However, these obstacles towards direct primary and secondary listings did not thwart 
some Taiwan merchants from circumventing these prohibitions. One way used to 
accomplish this was to list on both sides of the Strait with different entities belonging 
to the same group. For example, in 2005 the Taiwan-listed company Shenzhen Globe 
Union Industrial Corp. listed in the A section of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange,40 
becoming the first enterprise to list in both Taiwan and the A section in China41.  But 
the dual listing of Shenzhen Globe has not been emulated by any other Taiwanese 
companies who generally prefer to list in the Hong Kong market.  Beijing’s lack of 
enthusiasm for such listings post-2005 has also played a restrictive role.    
One other way to participate in Taiwan’s securities market is to issue Taiwan 
Depositary Receipts (TDR).  This was encouraged by the Taiwanese government in 
the second half of 2008 in order to allow prominent Taiwanese businesses operating 
in the Mainland to enter Taiwan’s capital markets and reverse the migration of 
Taiwanese capital. The campaign has been fairly successful in its short time, as there 
have been a total of 20 new listings of TDRs between October 2008 and  October 
2010.  
Of the eighteen TDRs issued thus far, all have been related to Taiwanese businesses 
with operations outside of Taiwan with the exception of three TDRs issued by 
                                                
38 See China Securities Regulatory Commission, Opinions on Certain Questions about Listing 
Companies with Foreign Investment (2001), online: 
<http://www.csrc.gov.cn/n575458/n776436/n804965/n3300690/n3300837/n3331795/3332267.html> . 
39 Ibid. 
40 See press release of Shenzhen Stock Exchange on May 31, 2005, online: 
<http://www.szse.cn/main/aboutus/sshd/ssys/200505317293.shtml>. The trading code of Global Union 
is “002047”. 
41 The parent company of Global Union is listed from 1999 in the Taiwan Stock Exchange with the 
trading code “9934”. 
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Singapore companies. Of the remaining fifteen, eleven share a common pattern. First, 
the company that applied for TDR issuance was established and controlled by 
Taiwanese merchants conducting business mainly in China. Second, shares deposited 
for the TDRs are the shares of a holding company typically incorporated in either the 
Cayman Islands or Bermuda. These holding companies are listed on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange.42 The Taiwanese food manufacturer Want Want provides a common 
example. Want Want’s controlling shareholder, a local tycoon, first incorporated a 
holding company in the Cayman Islands: Want Want China Holding Ltd (“WWCH”).  
This holding company was then listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.  As 
controlling shareholder of WWCH, the tycoon then transferred a certain number of 
WWCH shares to a depositary to support the TDRs offered in Taiwan.43 Its TDRs 
were officially listed on April 28, 2009.44 
Demand for further cross strait company integration is evident and given China’s 
rising economic clout, it is not surprising that certain Taiwanese firms would attempt 
to seek partnerships or linkages with Chinese firms. Thus, without the prevention 
afforded by regulatory restriction, it is fairly certain that a Chinese firm would attempt 
to buy into a listed Taiwanese company or have the securities of a third-country 
company listed in Taiwan. The latter has been accomplished through the issuance of 
TDRs by companies which are controlled by Chinese but incorporated and listed in 
Singapore. Yangzijian Shipbuilding (Holdings) Ltd (‘Yangzijian’), a big shipbuilder 
in China and is listed in the Singapore Exchange, was approved to issue TDRs in 
Taiwan in July 2010. One point worth noting is that Yangzijian, though effectively 
controlled by Chinese, is a company registered in Singapore. Thus, Yangzijian’s TDR 
issue could circumvent the rules against primary and secondary listing of securities of 
a company incorporated in China.  
                                                
42 Examples include Want Want, Tingyi (Cayman Islands) Holding Corp., Sandmartin International 
Holdings Ltd, New Focus Auto Tech Holdings Ltd, Kith Holdings Ltd, Neo-Neon Holdings Ltd, Good 
Friend International Holdings Inc, Ju Teng International Holdings Ltd, Global Sweeteners Holdings 
Ltd, Solargiga Energy Holdings Ltd, and Yorkey Optical International (Cayman) Ltd. 
43 See Want Want press release on Oct. 14, 2008, online: 
<http://www.wantwant.com.cn/images/up/News/2008101417411418511.pdf >.  
44 See Taiwan Stock Exchange press release on Apr. 15, 2009, online: 
<http://www.twse.com.tw/ch/about/press_room/tsec_news_detail.php?id=2838>. 
12 
 
 
The approval for Yangzijian’s TDR issuance marks the first time that a true Chinese-
controlled company entered into Taiwan’s stock market. However, like Want Want, 
the deposited shares were offered by a holding company of Yangzijian.45 It is not 
clear who actually owns the second holding company. Nonetheless, the Yangzijian 
TDR issue is one significant step toward a cross-strait capital market. As of October 
2010, at least two other Singaporean companies controlled by Chinese issued TDRs in 
the same manner.46 While there are still political issues to be addressed, we should 
bear in mind that there is a strong demand for a more liberalized capital market across 
the Taiwan Strait. From a legal perspective, the issue is how the law could help 
recoup benefits from cross-strait listings while controlling any potential hazards. 
These issues can be explored and examined under existing theories regarding cross-
border listing and regulatory competition.   
 
III. Theoretical Underpinnings: from 
Taiwan’s Perspective 
As the Taiwan government increasingly realizes the benefits of cross strait listings for 
its own domestic economy, it must attract capital amidst competition from both 
regional and international capital markets. In this light, the Sino-Taiwan relationship 
can be viewed in the context of academic research regarding cross-border listing, 
regulatory competition, and ultimately, the competition between ‘law markets’. We 
will adopt this perspective to address Taiwan’s competitive advantage and envisage 
Taiwan’s strategic position in the current state of globalization.  
A. Taiwan’s Advantage in Cross-Border 
                                                
45 See online: <http://money.chinatimes.com/news/news-
content.aspx?id=20100728001489&cid=1209>. 
46 They are China Taishan Technology Group Holdings Ltd and Hu An Cable Holdings Ltd. See 
Taiwan Stock Exchange, online: < 
http://www.twse.com.tw/ch/listed/listed_company/apply_listing_tdr.php>. 
13 
 
 
Listing 
Within the context of cross-border listings, Taiwan enjoys certain advantages that 
make it a good host. First, Taiwan’s economy has grown steadily over the past three 
decades, which provides a sound base for capital market growth (notwithstanding the 
recent effects of the global financial crisis). Second, the overall capitalization of the 
Taiwan Stock Exchange in relation to Taiwan’s national GDP is higher than that 
applicable to the New York and London Stock Exchanges.47  This implies the 
Taiwanese have a significant amount of money available to invest in the capital 
market. Third, market interest rates in Taiwan are hovering near zero, which suggests 
that the domestic market has extra capital to support new listings.48 Fourth, Taiwan is 
in a key geographical position between Northeast and Southeast Asia, making it an 
ideal place to conduct business in the Far East and listing in Taiwan is relatively 
cheap compared to Hong Kong or Singapore.49  Fifth, Taiwan is a global leader in 
information technology industries, which should attract foreign firms engaging in 
such operations.50 Finally, Taiwan has many individual investors eager to play the 
stock market. These advantages provide a fertile financing ground for capital-hungry 
firms to exploit.  
However, in speaking of Taiwan’s comparative advantages, we would be remiss if we 
did not mention its competitive position vis-à-vis Hong Kong.  As one of the leading 
financial centres for Greater China and the Asia-Pacific region, Hong Kong has 
successfully attracted listings from many major Taiwanese and mainland firms.  
However, this leading role is far from impenetrable.  To begin with, it is quite clear 
                                                
47 See Taiwan Stock Exchange, Advantages and Competition Strategy of Taiwan Capital Market, 
online: <http://www.twse.com.tw/ch/listed/alien_business/download/advantage.pdf >  
48 This has been illustrated where major U.S. and European banks issued structured notes in order to 
acquire cheap capital from Taiwanese retail investors seeking higher yields in a low interest rate 
environment. See “Thanks, Paulson” The Economist (Hong Kong 20 November 2008), online: 
<http://www.economist.com/finance/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=12652247>.   
49 See also Yi-ju Liu and Hsiou-wei Lin, Listing of Taiwanese Companies and the Development of 
Capital Market (2008) 153 Taiwan L. Rev. 79, 88. Technically, Taiwan is in the mid-point between 
Singapore and Japan. Taiwan is also less than two hours from Shanghai and about an hour from Hong 
Kong by plane. 
50 For example, by 2007, Taiwan manufactured over 98% of the world’s motherboards, over 93% of 
the world’s notebooks and over 76% of the world’s LCD panels. See supra note 47. In fact, electronic 
goods made in Taiwan constituted a significant part of Taiwan’s export to China. See supra note 4.  
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that Taiwan’s China-focused capital restrictions have been to the advantage of the 
Hong Kong stock exchange.  There has been considerable research supporting the 
idea that the listing of Taiwan companies in Hong Kong has occurred not because of 
any particular advantage in the “law market” from Hong Kong, but rather as a way to 
avoid Taiwan’s restrictions and secure capital for China based operations.51 It is also 
clear that this increase in the number of firms listing in Hong Kong has helped 
promote the Hong Kong market as the go-to destination for investors looking to share 
in mainland China’s economic growth.  However, given the amount and size of 
Taiwan corporate activity in the mainland, it is feasible that the Taiwan stock 
exchange could capture similar attention if relaxed capital rules lured these firms back. 
Further, the difference between the two exchanges within the “law market” does not 
appear to be very large. A study by JP Morgan on listing advantages between Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, and the US found the former two jurisdictions to be even in almost every 
category, with Hong Kong’s “high” investor protection against Taiwan’s “medium” 
the only significant aberration.52  Thus there is significant potential for the future 
growth of Taiwan’s capital market if regulations are relaxed. 
In terms of this market, we may analyze Taiwan’s advantages from two dimensions. 
On the one hand, it is clear that Taiwan is capable of attracting any overseas firms 
(incorporated in any country) controlled by Taiwanese. This aspect is welcomed by 
the current Taiwan government and is certainly the main focus of Taiwan’s present 
policy.  
On the other hand, a more ambitious approach would be to attract firms (incorporated 
in any country) controlled by mainland and overseas Chinese.  Such a listing in 
Taiwan could bring a number of advantages to Chinese firms. Chinese firms will 
likely receive positive media exposure if allowed to list in Taiwan and this might 
serve to allay fears over their products due to recent safety incidents concerning 
defectiveness or toxicity. Moreover, the abundance and far reach of Taiwan’s print 
and television media could promote the firm’s brand to the world’s Chinese-speaking 
                                                
51 Chang-hsien Tsai, Law Market Forces Underlying International Jurisdictional Competition: The 
Case of Taiwan’s Regulatory Evolution on Outward Investment in Mainland China, 1997-2008 89-90 
(2010). 
52 Ibid. 
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population.  Increased name recognition from a Taiwan listing could also help firms 
attract top Taiwanese talent.53 
Other benefits may also be derived from the shared culture across the Taiwan straits.  
Unlike Cantonese speaking Hong Kong, China and Taiwan share the use of the 
Mandarin language. Though small differences exist in written communication 
between Traditional and Simplified Chinese, Mainlanders and Taiwanese can 
generally understand each other without significant difficulty. The non-need to 
translate written documents into English further facilitates effective regulatory 
coordination between Taiwan and China.54 
Finally, Taiwan has a more established judicial system than China, with far more 
transparency in market disclosure and the freedom to transfer information. These 
qualities will draw firms seeking an evolved regulatory environment to help develop 
their corporate governance and investor protection mechanisms.55 
 In the end, the inescapable fact is that Taiwan needs foreign capital to improve and 
grow its economy.  Taiwan has the qualities and advantages to attract this capital from 
both Chinese and overseas Taiwanese businesses but current legal restraints prevent 
an effective cross-strait capital market.  By proactively seeking a balance between 
these multiple conflicts, the Taiwanese government can further drive the development 
of the domestic capital markets, improve financial services and related industries, and 
allow Taiwan to position itself as a major regional and global financial player. 
B. Regulatory Competition  
The development of a Sino-Taiwan cross-strait market may be examined from the 
perspective of regulatory responses to cross-border securities listings following the 
globalization of financial markets. Considerable research exists on the territorial reach 
                                                
53 See also supra note 47. 
54 However, it has been observed that it is still immature to apply the regulatory competition structure 
to the Sino-Taiwan context due to the political problems and lack of mutual understanding of each 
others’ laws. See Ching-ping Shao, Regulatory Competition in Corporate Regimes: And Some 
Observations on Possible Regime Changes in Taiwan (2009) 38(1) N.T.U. L.J. 1, 48.  
55 Ibid, at 47. 
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of securities regulation and its impact on domestic and international capital markets.56 
There has also been much research on the effects of regulatory competition, choice of 
securities law, and the global stock market’s regulatory framework.57 Such studies 
have fruitfully discussed the race-to-the-bottom or race-to-the-top trends caused by 
regulatory competition. We will take up these issues in Section IV.B of this paper. 
Beyond domestic governmental regulation, some scholars have advocated a more 
market-oriented approach such as establishing a coherent global regulatory scheme or 
network,58 to deal with problems from differences in securities regulation in different 
countries.59 Within the American-European context, several studies have focused on 
the legal ramifications of U.S.- E.U. cross-border securities listings. In particular, with 
                                                
56 See e.g. Chris Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Markets for Securities Laws (2008) 75 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 1435; Onnig H. Dombalagian, Choice of Law and Capital Market Regulation (2008) 82 
Tul. L. Rev. 1903; Frederick Tung, From Monopolists to Markets?: A Political Economy of Issuer 
Choice in International Securities Regulation (2002) 2002 Wis. L. Rev. 1363; Merritt B. Fox, The 
Political Economy of Statutory Reach: U.S. Disclosure Rules in a Globalizing Market for Securities 
(1998) 97 Mich. L. Rev. 696; Stephen J. Choi and Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: 
Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation (1998) 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 903; Stephen J. 
Choi and Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws, International Money: Regulation in a Global Capital 
Market (1997) 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1855. 
57 See e.g. Brummer, id.; Chris Brummer, Corporate Law Preemption in an Age of Global Capital 
Markets (2008) 81 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1067; Cheryl Nichols, Mutual Recognition Based on Substituted 
Compliance: An Integral Component of the SEC's Mandate (2008) 34 N.C. J Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 1; 
Stavros Gadinis, The Politics of Competition in International Financial Regulation (2008) 49 Harv. 
Int'l L.J. 447 (discussing the interplay between domestic politics and international financial regulatory 
framework); Howell E. Jackson, Centralization, Competition, and Privatization in Financial 
Regulation (2001) 2 Theoretical Inquiries L. 649; Stephen J. Choi and Andrew T. Guzman, National 
Laws, International Money: Regulation in a Global Capital Market (1997) 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1855; 
William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflection upon Delaware (1974) 83 Yale L.J. 663.   
58 See Frederick Tung, From Monopolists to Markets?: A Political Economy of Issuer Choice in 
International Securities Regulation (2002) 2002 Wis. L. Rev. 1363, at 1430-1431 (discussion on the 
short supply of legal rules and harmonization as an alternative ending). For discussion on the approach 
of harmonization, see also Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their 
Limits (2009) 34 Yale J. Int'l L. 113; Onnig H. Dombalagian, Choice of Law and Capital Market 
Regulation, (2008) 82 Tul. L. Rev. 1903; Stavros Gadinis, The Politics of Competition in International 
Financial Regulation (2008) 49 Harv. Int'l L.J. 447; Bo Harvey, Exchange Consolidation and Models 
of International Securities Regulation (2007) 18 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 151; Hal S. Scott, 
Internationalization of Primary Public Securities Markets (2000) 63 Law & Contemp. Probs. 71 . For 
international efforts on harmonization of securities regulation, see for example, International 
Organization of Securities Commissions, Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf>. 
59 See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation (1998) 
107 Yale L.J. 2359; Stephen J. Choi and Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the 
International Reach of Securities Regulation (1998) 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 903; Stephen J. Choi and 
Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws, International Money: Regulation in a Global Capital Market 
(1997)  65 Fordham L. Rev. 1855; Tung, id., at 1380 et seq. (discussing Romano’s and Choi & 
Guzman’s proposals).  
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discussions on the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 60  in the U.S., and the 
introduction of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 61  in Europe. 62 
regulatory competition. Moreover, there are researches on the impact of the creation 
of cross-Atlantic exchange groups (e.g. the NYSE-Euronext) on cross-border listings, 
securities regulation and competition.63 
Expanding on such bilateral cooperation, there is a further line of study addressing the 
competition of the “law market” in different jurisdictions.64 From this perspective, the 
advantage of a country is more than its economic environment and industrial output. 
Its ‘law’ might, in some sense, become a commodity that firms may choose to shop 
around for in order to maximise their benefits. This has been exemplified by the many 
examples of harsh laws forcing out firms to other places and by the choice of 
governing law and forum.65 In this sense, a country may seek to provide ‘better’ laws 
to attract business.66  We will examine this argument in the next section of this paper. 
Taiwan may be in a completely different circumstance, compared with the U.S. 
(where there is a federal government and fifty states) or the European Union (where 
laws of all member states have to be harmonized for the purpose of creating a single 
                                                
60 Pub. L. 107-204.   
61 Directive 2004/39/EC. 
62 See Dania S. Becker, Less Can Be More: Recent Examples of Cooperation between the United States 
and European Union on Securities Regulation (2009) 8 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 139; Howell E. 
Jackson and Eric J. Pan, Regulatory Competition in International Securities Market: Evidence from 
Europe -- Part II (2008) 3 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 207; Elizabeth F. Brown, The Tyranny of the Multitude 
IS A Multiplied Tyranny: Is the United States Financial Regulatory Structure Undermining U.S. 
Competitiveness? (2008) 2 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 369; Kate Litvak, Sarbanes-Oxley and The 
Cross-Listing Premium (2007) 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1857; Kate Litvak, The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act on Non-US Companies Cross-Listed in the US (2007) 13 J. Corp. Fin. 195; Howell E. Jackson, 
Centralization, Competition, and Privatization in Financial Regulation (2001) 2 Theoretical Inquiries 
L. 649. 
63 See e.g. Ioannis Kokkoris and Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, Some Issues on Cross-border Stock 
Exchange Mergers (2007) 29 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. 455; Ioannis Kokkoris and Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, 
Lessons from the Recent Stock Exchange Merger (2008) 4 J. Competition L. & Econ. 837; Bo Harvey, 
Exchange Consolidation and Models of International Securities Regulation (2007) 18 Duke J. Comp. 
& Int'l L. 151; Chris Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Markets for Securities Laws (2008) 75 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 1435; Onnig H. Dombalagian, Choice of Law and Capital Market Regulation (2008) 82 
Tul. L. Rev. 1903; Mahmood Bagheri and Chizu Nakajima, Competition And Integration Among Stock 
Exchanges: The Dilemma of Conflicting Regulatory Objectives And Strategies (2004) 24 O.J.L.S. 69. 
64 See Erin  A. O’hara & Larry E. Ribstein, The Law Market 13-14 (2009); Roberta Romano, Law as a 
Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle (1985) 1 J. L. Econ. & Org. 225; Albert O. 
Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (1970). 
65 Ibid, at Ch. 3.  
66 Ibid, at 26-31. 
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market). Due to space limitations, this article cannot discuss all the theories and 
arguments in full detail. Nonetheless, there are several lessons that Taiwan may learn 
from the U.S. and European experience.  
C. Lessons for Taiwan 
First, Taiwan enjoys a definite advantage over western capital markets in terms of 
attracting firms operated by Taiwanese or Chinese individuals. While attracting non-
Taiwanese and non-Chinese foreign capital might be a long-term goal, given the close 
historical and trade ties across the Taiwan Strait, a more realistic short-term goal is to 
focus on attracting the listing within Taiwan of overseas firms operated by Taiwanese 
or Chinese individuals.     
Second, if the economy provides the foundation, the law will provide solutions. In 
order to open up the market for firms doing considerable business in China (whether 
Taiwanese controlled or not), the legal restraints on Chinese investment or Chinese 
shareholding should be relaxed or abandoned. Taiwan would do well to lessen 
restrictions on the capitalization of firms and the use of Taiwan raised funds as they 
apply to foreign and domestic issuers. Allowing Chinese financial firms to operate in 
Taiwan (and vice versa) would also help service any potential cross-strait listing and 
compliance with both China and Taiwan law. Unfortunately, this aspect is subject to 
considerable political debate and the development of a mutual relationship between 
Beijing and Taipei, which  is beyond the scope of this article. 
Third, applying regulatory competition and international legal market theories, 
Taiwan may attract Chinese capital by designing securities regulation and listing rules 
which provide ‘better laws’ as an incentive to minimize compliance costs (assuming 
that other entry barriers can be reduced). It has been argued that “national securities 
regulators face intense pressure to provide cost-effective rules to draw foreign issuers 
to their home markets.”67 Though it would be overreaching to suggest Taiwan can 
become a leading capital market by having extremely issuer-friendly laws, or by 
                                                
67 Chris Brummer, Corporate Law Preemption in an Age of Global Capital Markets (2008) 81 S. Cal. 
L. Rev. 1067, 1067-1068. 
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completely emulating another country such as the U.S.,68 Taiwan could devise cost-
effective capital market rules to fully realize its competitive advantages. It is from this 
perspective that this article will continue to analyze the liberalization of Taiwan’s 
securities market in the context of cross-strait listing of securities.  
IV.  
Concerns and Legal Responses 
There are a number of policy concerns raised by the liberalization of the cross-strait 
market.  In the following sections we will discuss what Taiwan could achieve in the 
region through strategic policies, the possibilities for bilateral cooperation, and the 
ways in which Taiwan could strengthen its domestic supervisory regime.  Lastly we 
propose the creation of a separate market for foreign listings within Taiwan for firms 
having considerable business in China. 
A. Policy Concerns 
The biggest concern regarding cross-strait listing relates to sovereignty and national 
security. The ultimate worry is that the growing economic connection across the 
Taiwan Strait is a prelude to reunification. As one Chinese scholar summarized: “[a 
free-trade agreement is] a start toward full cross-strait economic integration and a 
necessary condition for marching forward toward final unification.”69 The fear of 
being relegated to “local-government” status under Beijing’s rule (as in Hong Kong 
or Macau) has dominated the arguments of the opposition party in Taiwan. 
Nonetheless, a counter-argument is that the current amount of Taiwanese investment 
in China, accomplished in various roundabout ways, suggest that legal restraints do 
not prevent corporations from shifting their industrial base to China.  
                                                
68 See also Stephen J. Choi and Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws, International Money: Regulation 
in a Global Capital Market (1997) 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1855, 1866-1869. 
69 Ariana E. Cha, Taiwan, China Negotiating a Landmark Free-trade Agreement, Washington Post 
(Feb. 21, 2009), online: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/02/20/AR2009022003388.html?sub=new>. 
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Apart from the sovereignty issue, Taiwan has other policy concerns exacerbated by 
the lack of understanding and communication between China and Taiwan, even 
though those concerns are common to all cross-border listing of securities. Pursuant to 
the key objectives declared by the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (“IOSCO”) in 2003 regarding cross-border markets70, Taiwan needs to 
protect domestic investors; ensure market fairness, efficiency and transparency; and 
reduce systemic risk.71 Timely and accurate disclosure of financial results and other 
material information as well as maintenance of internationally accepted accounting 
and auditing standards are also important regulatory objectives.72 
However, while the existence of an information gap is a common regulatory problem 
for cross-border supervision,73 the autocratic nature of the Chinese government does 
worsen the attainment of these objectives to a certain extent. Specifically, China’s 
lack of information transparency and a governmental tendency to interfere in the 
private market may lead to fraud and market abuse. Given China’s tight control on 
media and the internet, it is also doubtful whether material information could be 
disclosed in a timely manner whenever such materiality conflicts with sensitive 
political issues. Even if it is disclosed, its reliability raises a question mark. In 
addition, investigating and enforcing rules on a foreign firm can be very costly. Such 
costs make cross-border markets inefficient and could invite regulatory arbitrage of 
market participants from different countries.  
Another issue in cross-strait listings is that Taiwan only accepts reports (and 
consolidated reports) prepared under Taiwanese accounting standards. This article 
would not venture too far into the differences between Taiwanese and Chinese 
accounting standards. Nevertheless, if it is to attract the listings of mainland 
companies, we suggest the government allow reports made under PRC accounting 
                                                
70 See IOSCO, Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, online: 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf>. 
71 IOSCO, ibid, at 5-6. 
72 IOSCO, ibid, at 23-26. 
73 See Frederick Tung, From Monopolists to Markets?: A Political Economy of Issuer Choice in 
International Securities Regulation (2002) 2002 Wis. L. Rev. 1363, 1370-1372; Bo Harvey, Exchange 
Consolidation and Models of International Securities Regulation (2007) 18 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 
151, 159. 
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standards.74 From a more global perspective, the Taiwan government could also 
consider adopting international accounting standards to attract more foreign listings.75   
In terms of regulatory supervision, one of the main issues bound to appear in any 
discussion of cross-strait listings is that Taiwanese investors may have no recourse 
against a wrongdoing Chinese firm since it is questionable how far a Chinese court or 
regulator would go to protect foreign investors. The Taiwan government would not be 
able to control how a Chinese issuer uses the money raised in Taiwan once the funds 
are dispatched overseas. Given the possibility of Chinese firms abusing Taiwan’s 
financial market, this lack of official protection must be addressed.  
Against this backdrop, Taiwan’s government is likely to feel more comfortable 
expanding capital market opportunities initially to firms controlled by Taiwanese. It is 
easier to track these firms’ assets and key personnel in Taiwan. On the other, 
Taiwan’s government is certainly more familiar with local Taiwanese merchants, 
most of whom also have considerable business in Taiwan. Such familiarity is lost in 
the case of a Chinese controlled company.  
Nevertheless, it is wrong to suggest that it is much easier to supervise firms 
established by Taiwanese in China or in other countries. As suggested earlier, it is 
common for Taiwanese merchants to conduct their main business in China by way of 
a company incorporated off-shore in the Caribbean. Taiwan’s regulator thus faces a 
problem of accommodating relevant laws in at least four different countries (e.g. 
company law in Cayman Island, securities laws in Hong Kong, business laws in 
China and relevant laws in Taiwan). Piercing through complex shareholding structure 
(which might be designed to circumvent Taiwan’s a harsh legal restraints over 
investment in China in the first place) may also be a challenging task.  
As long as their main business is in China, the problem of transparency and accurate 
disclosure always exists, no matter whether the firm is controlled by Taiwanese, 
                                                
74 In fact, in China, the new accounting rules published by the Ministry of Finance (effective from 2007) 
are generally based on the IFRS principles. 
75 In February 2009, it was reported the FSC is prepared to adopt the IFRS rules; but unfortunately no 
timetable has been set. China Times (Feb. 19, 2009), online: 
<http://chinatimes.com/CMoney/News/News-Page-
content/0,4993,11050709+122009021900369,00.html>. 
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Chinese or foreigners. Having noted the problems inherent in the cross-straits 
regulatory supervision, this article will offer several different perspectives to consider 
the resolution of potential legal problems arising from cross-strait listing of securities. 
B. Regulatory Competition in the Greater 
China Area?  
Having identified firms controlled by Taiwanese outside Taiwan or by Chinese inside 
or outside China as the main target for cross-strait listing, then the question is how to 
design laws to leverage Taiwan’s advantage versus other forums such as Hong Kong 
and Singapore. Theories regarding regulatory competition and “race-to-the-bottom or 
top” scenarios might help benefit our perspective. 
With the recent relaxation of restrictions on foreign firms with significant Chinese 
funds or shareholders, there are now two paths worth exploring in Taiwan’s bid to 
increase its capital market’s global competitiveness.  First, one option is to make 
Taiwanese law more friendly to issuers than that of other regional competitors.  This 
would resonate with firms seeking to list in a less regulated environment. However, 
this tactic might also result in a “race-to-the-bottom” scenario, which could ultimately 
backfire on Taiwan’s ambitions.76 From a political standpoint, it is unlikely Taiwan 
would amend its laws to cater to foreign firms at the expense of its domestic 
investors.77 Moreover, although Taiwan has a more established and transparent legal 
system than China, it still falls behind Hong Kong and Singapore in several 
competitive aspects.78  
                                                
76 See Choi and Guzman, supra note 68 , at 1872-1874. In contrast, countries might also “race to the 
top” because the reduction of compliance costs (due to less regulation) might be outweighed by 
additional information costs and risk involved. Ibid, at 1870. See also Chris Brummer, supra note 67, 
at 1441-1446 (discussion of choice of law reform and pure regulatory market). 
77 As we will argue later, one way to circumvent this problem is to establish an alternative trading 
market in Taiwan to host Chinese and/or foreign securities so that Taiwan could still maintain local 
standards in the domestic stock market. See infra IV.E. 
78 For example, in the most recent Global Competitiveness Survey conducted by the World Economic 
Forum, Taiwan was ranked 17th, while Singapore was ranked 5th and Hong Kong 11th. See online: 
<http://www.weforum.org/pdf/gcr/2008/rankings.pdf>. 
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Were Taiwan not to pursue a race-to-the-bottom regulatory environment, another 
option would be to raise the quality of Taiwanese law so that Taiwan can gain an 
advantage in the ‘law market’ by “racing to the top”. One obvious way is to make 
Taiwanese law as close to international standards as possible, though this might also 
mean the abandonment of domestic rules. This approach has its own problem. On the 
one hand, it is always debatable which rule is ‘better’.  Typically the definition of a 
“good” rule equates with “less regulation” which though sound in theory can be 
dangerous in practice (and which paradoxically may lead to more race-to-the-bottom 
arguments). The quality of relevant rules is more than merely about securities 
regulations and listing rules. The whole legal system, from contract law to the 
judiciary system, should be examined. Between Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, 
we will also face the difficulties of comparing common law and civil law systems in 
this analysis.  At the same time, even if we can successfully define a ‘better’ rule, the 
costs to comply with such high standards might become too high to attract firms from 
listing in Taiwan.  
In the end, it is a policy dilemma. Both the “race-to-the-bottom” and the “race-to-the-
top” theories have their appeal, but it remains to be seen which approach would 
improve Taiwan’s competitiveness against other Asian countries. On this basis, this 
article believes Taiwan should conduct a comparative study of its laws with those of 
Hong Kong, China, and Singapore to understand its current advantages and 
disadvantages. Then we can hypothesize on the impact of regulatory competition – 
whether it is to the bottom or to the top − in the Greater China area. 
C. Regulatory Cooperation 
To help reduce regulatory arbitrage and coordinate securities laws from different 
jurisdictions, international organizations have attempted to harmonize rules governing 
capital markets.79 This legalization has resulted in the following regulatory efforts: 
regulatory cooperation and communication, mutual recognition and convergence of 
                                                
79 For criticism of harmonization approach, see Bo Harvey, Exchange Consolidation and Models of 
International Securities Regulation (2007) 18 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 151; Hal S. Scott, 
Internationalization of Primary Public Securities Markets, 63 Law & Contemp. Probs. (2000) 71, 77-
80. 
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national regulators, and the harmonization of laws.80 We will address each of these in 
turn. Unfortunately, most of these actions will surely meet political difficulty if 
exercised in the Sino-Taiwan context. Cooperation between stock exchanges may be 
one way to  circumvent the political difficulties that normally overshadow any official 
talk between Taiwan and China.   
First, regulatory cooperation and communication could be enhanced if the two 
countries signed a memorandum of understanding (“MOU”) to ensure better 
supervision of the capital markets and of public companies.81 According to the 
IOSCO, “[a] regulatory system should allow for assistance to be provided to foreign 
regulators who need to make inquiries in the discharge of their functions and exercise 
of their powers.”82 Thus, “[i]nternational cooperation between regulators is necessary 
for the effective regulation of domestic markets.”83 The IOSCO has also published 
guidelines to ensure all MOUs share certain basic terms.84  
Such an understanding is not without historical precedent. The Financial Supervision 
Commission (“FSC”) in Taiwan signed three memorandums of understanding with 
Chinese banking, securities, and insurance regulators respectively on Nov. 16, 2009.85 
This may provide the foundation for supervision of financial institutions across the 
Taiwan Strait. However, these MOUs target the supervision of financial institutions 
and not individual firms; thus it is dubious whether they may provide an efficient 
vehicle to regulate listed firms located in China. Moreover, even the FSC admitted 
that the MOUs only provided a basis for voluntary cooperation and were not legally 
binding.86 From this perspective, the signature of MOUs was a first step toward a 
higher level of official cooperation; but it will be imprudent to treat MOUs as a cure-
                                                
80 Scott, id. at 78; Harvey, id.; Dombalagian, supra note 56, at 1928 et seq.; Tung, supra note 73, at 
1378-1379 (discussion of global harmonization efforts).  
81 Using Hong Kong for comparison, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (“HKSE”) would consider an 
application for listing of a Chinese firm when there are communication and cooperation arrangements 
between the HKSE and Chinese regulators. See HKSE Listing Rules (Mainboard), §19A.03, online: 
<http://www.hkex.com.hk/rule/listrules/vol1_2.htm>. 
82 IOSCO, supra note 70, at 17.  
83 Ibid. 
84 See IOSCO, Principles for Memoranda of Understanding (1991), online: 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD17.pdf>. 
85 See FSC press release on Dec. 4, 2009, online: 
<http://web.fsc.gov.tw/Layout/main_en/News_NewsContent.aspx?NewsID=38541&frame=16&Langu
ageType=2&path=1878>. 
86 Ibid. 
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all as their enforceability is always subject to political good will in the Sino-Taiwan 
relationship.  
As for mutual recognition and the convergence of regulators, sovereignty concerns 
and the improbability of reunification make such options near impossible. It is equally 
unlikely that Taiwan and China would want to form an EU-like organization over 
Greater China given the sensitive political environment. 
Finally, harmonization of laws, i.e., having a blueprint for integrated laws, might 
improve simplicity and reduce compliance costs.87 However, it is uncertain whether 
such measures, when applied to the Taiwan, China and Hong Kong legal systems, 
would create a better regulatory and investment environment.88  
Therefore, if direct official cooperation is difficult to achieve, an agreement between 
the Taiwan Stock Exchange and the Shanghai Stock Exchange / Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange might be considered. In a way, stock exchanges function as “facilitators of 
law”.89 Since stock exchanges are in theory private business entities, an MOU 
between stock exchanges would not incur the many difficulties which arise from an 
MOU between two government bodies. Also, stock exchanges are usually a monopoly 
(as in Taiwan) or an oligopoly (as in China).  Though the stock exchanges of both 
countries maintain government ties, their quasi-private nature ensures that steps taken 
towards cooperation would face a lessened amount of political significance and 
interference. If cooperative rules are introduced via the stock exchanges, they would 
have minimal effect on each nation’s laws. This provides more flexibility for cross-
strait supervision of market participants.  
Moreover, regulatory cooperation between stock exchanges may naturally result in 
the harmonization of exchange rules. Harmonization could reduce listing costs, and 
might also help construct a platform for cross-strait information disclosures, and 
                                                
87 Whether these so-called “transnational regulatory networks” (e.g. the IOSCO or Basel Committee, 
etc.) are effective is a lively issue. See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Network and 
Their Limit (2009) 34 Yale J. Int'l L. 113 (discussing the promise and perils of transnational regulatory 
networks). See also Stavros Gandinis, The Politics of Competition in International Financial 
Regulation (2008) 49 Harv. Int'l L.J. 447. 
88 See supra note 58. 
89 Brummer, supra note 76, at 1452-1455; Romano, supra note 59 , at 2399 et seq. (discussing 
regulation by exchanges as an alternative to the market approach to securities regulation). See also 
Dombalagian, supra note 56 at 1942 et seq. (arguing exchanges as choice-of-law arbiters). 
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corporate governance practices, leading to more coherency and transparency in cross-
strait listings. 
In summary, there are considerable obstacles in having Taiwan and China’s regulators 
officially agree to mutual recognition and supervisory cooperation to create a cross-
strait market.  Each party must be willing to compromise its sovereignty. Under such 
circumstances, cooperation between stock exchanges would be easier given the 
lessened political significance attached to such a partnership. Unfortunately, this 
option has not been widely proposed or discussed, but we hope this idea will soon be 
taken up. 
 
D. Strengthening Domestic Supervision: An 
Independent Third-Party Sponsor? 
Having addressed both regulatory competition and regulatory cooperation as possible 
avenues for cross-strait listing mechanisms we now turn our attention to two 
independent options: the use of a third-party sponsor, and the creation of an 
alternative market. 
Currently, use of sponsors as corporate overseers has some precedent within Greater 
China. In Taiwan, an issuer is required by law to hire an underwriter for at least six 
months before filing for listing. The underwriter acts in an advisory capacity to ensure 
the company’s application for offering or listing meets all regulatory requirements. 
This is achieved by assisting the firm on capital formation and its corporate structure 
and helping revise the firm’s articles of corporation, prepare the prospectus, and 
negotiate with the Taiwan Stock Exchange.90 The underwriter must also file periodic 
reports to the Financial Supervisory Commission and the Taiwan Stock Exchange, 
and file a final recommendation report to the regulator before the issuer files for 
offering or listing.  
                                                
90 See generally Chinese Securities Association Guidelines for Information to be published in 
Assessments of Securities Underwriters for Offering and Issuance of Securities by Foreign Issuer 
(2009). 
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The function of underwriters in Taiwan is similar that of a sponsor in other countries.  
In Hong Kong, “[a] new applicant must appoint a sponsor to assist it with its initial 
application for listing”.91 A sponsor must be independent of an applicant and his 
underwriters and is expected to perform its duties with impartiality.92 As with the 
Taiwanese underwriter, a sponsor is closely involved in the preparation of the new 
applicant’s listing documents, conducts due diligence inquiries and ensures certain 
listing requirements are complied with.93. This regime is practiced in the U.K.,94 
Singapore95 and China (there called “recommendation party”). 96  
Currently, the function of the underwriter in Taiwan is limited to the pre-listing stage. 
No regime exists to ensure that a firm would continue to meet all regulatory 
requirements after its listing application is approved. Thus there is considerable space 
to apply the pre-listing regulatory requirements of a sponsor to the post-listing stage.  
Such a system would also have advantageous carry-over effects towards the 
development of Taiwan’s own financial services industry. Given the mentioned 
difficulties in regulating a foreign-incorporated company, a sponsorship regime is 
well worth considering.  
While currently the cost for an initial public offering in Taiwan is less than in Hong 
Kong, an increase in pre-listing application and post-listing compliance costs as a 
result of a sponsor-driven regulatory regime might affect that advantage and 
discourage foreign listings. However, this risk would be reduced if Taiwanese law 
followed international standards. The Taiwan government should consider adopting 
                                                
91 HKSE Listing Rules (Main Board), §3A.02, online: 
<http://www.hkex.com.hk/rule/listrules/Chapter_3A.pdf>. 
92 Ibid, at 3A.06 et seq. 
93 Ibid, at 3A.11. 
94 See Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (c 8), section 88; FSA Handbook, LR 8.6 & 8.7 (2009). 
95 In Singapore, if a firm plans to list in the Catalist board of the Singapore Exchange (SGX), the firm 
has to hire a full sponsor or continuing sponsor pursuant to Catalist rules. See SGX Catalist Rules, 
Chapter 2, online: 
<http://www.sgx.com/wps/portal/corporate/cpen/regulation/rulebooks_manuals/catalist_rules>. 
96 China Securities Act, art 11 (2005). Translation excerpted from online: 
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2006-04/18/content_570077.htm>. In fact, the 
recommendation system has been adopted by the CSRC in 2003, even before the promulgation of the 
Securities Act in 2005. The rules are called “Provisional Rules of Recommendation Regime for 
Securities Issuance and Listing” (“Recommendation Rules”), issued pursuant to the CSRC Chairman’s 
Order No. 18 on 2003 (last revised on 2004). The full texts can be found online: 
<http://202.106.183.108/n575458/n870824/n8358456/10247389.html>. 
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accounting standards97 and corporate governance and disclosures rules that are in line 
with global principles to minimize such costs.98  
Another consideration is that a sponsorship scheme has limits. One cannot assume a 
sponsor can resolve all difficulties in cross-strait listings. It would be imprudent to 
completely rely on a sponsor to bridge the information gap between Taiwan 
regulators and a Chinese firm. It is also doubtful whether a sponsor could always 
reliably assess a firm’s qualifications. If the sponsor is Taiwanese, the question is 
whether the sponsor is capable of determining a Chinese firm’s compliance with 
Taiwanese laws. If the sponsor is Chinese, the question then becomes whether its 
recommendation is trustworthy. Ultimately, sponsorships will be pointless if the 
sponsor’s sole function is to be a scapegoat or a deep pocket. Potential sponsors may 
be deterred by these associated liabilities. 
In summary, we believe strengthening Taiwan’s supervisory scheme by requiring an 
independent sponsor is one way to correct the regulatory deficiency in cross-strait 
listings. But it must be noted that this method has its limitations and cannot be a 
panacea to all issues in a cross-strait capital market. 
E. An Alternative Market: Let the Market 
Decide? 
If a direct official supervisory cooperation or a efficient regulatory scheme is not 
practical, why not let the market develop through investors’ actions? The government 
could construct a separate platform with a different set of rules for Chinese listings 
under the Taiwan Stock Exchange,99 while allowing overall regulatory standards to 
                                                
97 See also supra note 75. 
98 For example, see Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, Principles of Corporate 
Governance (2004), online: 
<http://www.oecd.org/document/49/0,3343,en_2649_34813_31530865_1_1_1_1,00.html>; IOSCO, 
International Disclosure Standards for Cross-border Offering and Initial Listings by Foreign Issuers 
(1998), online: <http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_corpfin/crossborder.pdf >. 
99 This is similar to a regime adopted by Bovespa of Brazil. The Bovespa installed three different 
listing and corporate governance standards for firms to follow. See International Chamber of 
Commerce, How Brazil’s Novo Mercado is changing the way companies access capital (Feb. 15, 2006), 
online: <http://www.iccwbo.org/iccfigg/index.html>. See also Shao, supra note 54, at 45-46. 
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remain the same.100 This would be similar to establishing an off-shore free zone, 
“where issuers are free to issue securities to investors from any country under one set 
of rules”.101 
If the rules for this market conform more to international standards, it might reduce 
listing and compliance costs for Chinese or foreign issuers while still allowing issuers 
to enjoy Taiwan’s advantages. Of course, foreign issuers may still have the option to 
list in the regular market to lure local investors if they so choose.  
For investors, they can choose to invest in the regular market or in the alternative 
market where the government makes clear that it applies less control and supervision. 
This may lead to a change of the regulatory ideology in Taiwan: from a more merit-
based approach to an informed risk-based regulatory system.  
For regulators, they would have the chance to evaluate local and international 
supervisory standards, and observe the competition between the regular and 
alternative markets. If investors react conservatively to securities listed in the 
alternative market due to lack of transparency or higher risk, then Taiwan should 
maintain its current standards. If the alternative market is well received and even 
attracts domestic listings, it may be time for Taiwan’s regulators to reconsider its 
policies and regulations.  
By creating a separate and more liberal market, Taiwan might be able to bypass 
political difficulties and attract foreign capital. Of course, it would be naïve to assume 
investors always judge wisely. An informed decision hinges on the full disclosure of 
material information and the corporation’s continued compliance with regulations. 
Additionally, an advanced supervisory scheme is essential for effective and efficient 
market regulation.  
 
                                                
100 This method is similar to a model proposed by Professor Jackson in Nepal. See Howell E. Jackson, 
Centralization, Competition, and Privatization in Financial Regulation (2001) 2 Theoretical Inquiries 
L. 649, 668-669. 
101 Scott, supra note 79, at 78 & 92 et seq. Professor Scott argued that the off-shore free zones are the 
best and most realistic alternative for possibly dealing with the need for optimal standardization 
issuance in the global context. Ibid. 
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V. Conclusion 
Though capital restrictions have stymied the development of Taiwan’s capital markets 
over the past two decades, greater relaxation and opening should facilitate a return of 
local firms.  At the same time, Taiwan’s competitive advantages may also begin to 
attract other overseas firms. In sum, Taiwan is in a strategic position to attract not 
only money from overseas Taiwanese merchants but also Chinese capital.  
In conjunction with the ongoing development of Taiwan’s capital market, regulatory 
competition within the Greater China area is set to increase.  We believe Taiwan 
should conduct a comparative study of its laws with those of Hong Kong, China, and 
Singapore to understand its current advantages and disadvantages. In a way, China 
and Taiwan, along with Hong Kong and perhaps Singapore, can offer genuine 
regulatory competition within the Greater China capital market. At the same time, the 
prospects for official regulatory cooperation between Beijing and Taiwan are less than 
bright given the long political deadlock and lack of mutual understanding between the 
two parties. 
Assuming that the creation of the cross-strait capital market is an unstoppable trend, 
this paper examines several regimes that may facilitate Taiwan’s attempt to control 
and supervise Chinese companies seeking to tap into Taiwan’s capital market. This 
paper would argue that regulatory cooperation or even harmonization of Sino-Taiwan 
laws in the European model, may be an interesting idea but would prove to be very 
difficult in practice. A more viable approach is to strengthen domestic supervision in 
Taiwan with a sponsorship program like we have seen in Hong Kong.  Such a system 
would improve Taiwan’s competitive position and its investor protection reputation 
among international investors. However, the sponsorship program runs considerable 
risk that the sponsor will become either a rubber stamp or, if compliance costs are too 
high, simply too expensive. Given the regulatory obstacles between Taiwan and 
China, a better approach might be to open an alternative trading market containing 
more flexible rules for Chinese (or foreign) securities in Taiwan. This kind of market-
oriented approach may maintain the level of domestic investor protection without 
imposing higher costs in terms of regulation and compliance.  
